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Air pollution still represents a major environmental hazard in urban areas in the European 
Union (EU). This article argues that the EU’s regulatory framework in this policy area for the 
past decade contributed to a series of unintended consequences. The increasing influence of 
climate change objectives on the air pollution agenda led to a shift in the regulatory approach 
to emissions from vehicles by focusing solely on the overriding interest of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions and developing individual policies to that effect. This resulted in a 
disconnect between regulatory approaches to urban air quality and vehicle emissions 
standards with the effect of producing unintended consequences of unlawful levels of air 
pollution, in particular nitrogen oxides and particulate matter emissions as well as unintended 
consequences for the car industry and consumers. The article applies Merton’s framework of 
unintended consequences, which provides a useful explanatory model of the EU’s multi-level 
governance process in the complex area of environmental law. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The scale and severity of the effects of urban air pollution have become increasingly apparent 
in recent years. The 2016 WHO report on air pollution unequivocally identified it as the 
biggest environmental risk to health, with an ‘increasing number of acute air pollution 
episodes in many cities worldwide’.1 While air quality has seen substantial improvements in 
the European Union (EU), especially in regard to reducing the carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions as a result of its ambitious climate change agenda, urban air quality still persists as 
a significant environmental challenge.
2
 Despite the reduction in CO2 emissions there continue 
to be unlawful levels of emissions of nitrogen oxide (NOx) and particulate matter (PM), 
originating predominantly from road transport. Just in Europe, around 400,000 premature 
deaths are caused annually by pollution from road transport.
3
 
A good illustration of large-scale breaches of nitrogen oxide and particulate matter air 
pollution standards in Member States were recently exposed in ClientEarth v Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which unveiled the severity of air 
pollution in the United Kingdom (UK).
4
 In 2010, several limits values for nitrogen dioxide 
prescribed in the Ambient Air Quality Directive were exceeded in 40 of the 43 zones or 
agglomerations within the UK. In July 2011, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
ClientEarth initiated a judicial review seeking a declaration that the UK was in breach of its 
obligation to comply with nitrogen dioxide limits provided in Article 13 of the Air Quality 
Directive 2008/50 and sought a mandatory order compelling the Secretary of State to produce 
an air quality plan pursuant to Article 22 of this Directive.
5
 This proceeding raised important 
questions about the interpretation of obligations imposed on Member States in Articles 22 
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and 23 of the Directive and the jurisdiction of national courts to act in cases when a Member 
State fails to meet the requirements stipulated in Article 13 of the Directive. The Supreme 
Court made a declaration that the UK was in breach of Article 13 of the Air Quality Directive 
2008/50 and the UK Government agreed to publish new air quality plans by December 2015.
6
 
The ClientEarth judgment pointed to a wider problem of poor compliance, which is 
not only confined to the UK but also affects other EU Member States.
7
 Furthermore, the 
problem of air pollution across the EU raises concerns about the EU’s approach to regulating 
urban air pollution and its contribution to the emergence of unintended consequences which, 
over time, resulted in unlawful levels of air pollution, especially nitrogen oxides and 
particulate matter originating predominantly from road transport. Though Member States 
have a primary responsibility to implement and ensure compliance with EU laws and 
policies, success in their enforcement at the national level depends on the appropriateness of 
the regulatory approach adopted by the EU to achieve its environmental objectives. 
This article argues that, notwithstanding the significant number of EU measures 
aimed at improving air pollution over the years, the EU’s regulatory framework in this policy 
area for the past decade contributed to a series of unintended consequences. The increasing 
influence of climate change objectives on the air pollution agenda led to a change in the 
regulatory approach to emissions from vehicles by focusing solely on the overriding interest 
of reducing CO2 emissions and developing individual policies to that effect. This resulted in a 
disconnect between regulatory approaches to urban air quality and vehicle emissions 
standards, with the effect of producing unintended consequences of unlawful levels of air 
pollution, in particular nitrogen oxides and particulate matter emissions. As this policy of 
reducing CO2 levels proved to be very successful, it went unquestioned for longer and 
consequently exacerbated the air pollution effects. The Volkswagen emissions scandal of 
2015 unveiled spill-over effects of unintended consequences of EU air pollution law.
8
 In 
order to curb the emissions, the car industry will face new and higher compliance costs and it 
will have to change its business strategy to develop electric and hybrid technologies. The car 
industry will also have to address the undermined consumer confidence in the aftermath of 
the scandal. 
The article will apply Merton’s framework of unintended consequences, which has a 
significant purchase in EU environmental law.
9
 It provides a useful explanatory model of the 
EU’s multi-level governance process in the complex area of environmental law where 
anticipating those policy outcomes is particularly challenging. The diversity of the EU as a 
political system, combined with the complexity of the natural environment, means that 
environmental policy in the EU may be susceptible to unintended consequences. The EU’s 
overriding interest in regulating CO2 emissions aligns to Merton’s notion of ‘imperious 
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immediacy of interest’ as a factor limiting the correct anticipation of policy outcomes.10 This 
overriding interest led to a disconnect between the producers of EU policy (the European 
Commission, Member State governments, and all other stakeholders) and consumers (EU 
citizens) and thus explains the EU’s failure to anticipate the outcomes of its formal policy on 
air pollution. Most importantly, Merton’s explanatory model reveals the deficiencies of the 
EU regulatory approach in this policy area, which led to increased air pollution for millions 
of Europeans. While specific policy recommendations are beyond the scope of this article, 
there are potentially significant policy implications for the formulation of environmental 
policy in the EU. 
The article first provides a broad overview of the concept of unintended consequences 
and outlines the application of Merton’s model to EU air pollution law and policy. The article 
next demonstrates a shift away from the initial approach to urban air quality in favour of an 
immediate interest in reducing CO2 emissions. This is done by examining the EU’s early 
approach to urban air quality, including the measures on vehicle emissions, followed by an 
analysis of the subsequent laws and policies primarily targeted at reducing CO2 emissions 
from vehicles. The article then explores the unintended consequences of EU action, including 
both intended and unintended effects, and examines the correlation between the EU’s action 
and its unanticipated consequences. The article concludes by indicating the limitations of the 
EU policy process in this area and suggesting potential considerations for improvement. 
 
2 MERTON’S FRAMEWORK OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND EU AIR 
POLLUTION LAW AND POLICY 
 
The concept of unintended consequences has been a standing concern in multiple social 
contexts. The positivist school of thought, in particular thinkers such as Saint Simon and 
Comte, argued that the rational application of science to social questions would eliminate 
unintended consequences.
11
 Other thinkers, for example Hayek, were sceptical as to claims of 
reducing unintended consequences.
12
 Merton’s contribution to the development of this 
concept lies in his systematic analysis of the problem by considering all the elements and 
conditions of an action.
13
 He uses the term ‘unanticipated consequences of purposive social 
action’ to denote consequences which are the outcomes of a specific action.14 It is 
synonymous with ‘unintended consequences’, which, as De Zwart explains, has come to 
replace the term unanticipated consequences.
15
 Though we often associate unintended 
consequences with undesirable effects, this is not necessarily the case.
16
 Adam Smith 
famously wrote of an economic actor led ‘by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention’.17 Unintended consequences result from the actor’s conduct as 
distinct from the actor’s behaviour, because faced with a choice of actions one was chosen.18 
Though Merton recognizes unorganized and formally organized actions, he is more interested 
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in the latter as these involve the unintended outcomes of formal policy and provide a clearer 
opportunity to examine formal processes’ purposes and procedures.19 
Merton recognizes three barriers to a correct anticipation of consequences of action.
20
 
The most obvious is lack of adequate knowledge as the correct anticipation of consequences 
relies on this. The second factor is error that may occur in any stage of purposive action, from 
the inception of an action to its execution. The third factor refers to situations where an actor 
is primarily interested in foreseen immediate consequences and excludes other consequences 
potentially resulting from the same action.
21
 While Merton provides an explanatory model of 
unintended consequences, Vernon contests that this notion merges together a ‘number of 
quite distinct mechanisms of change, and that none of these mechanisms will bear weight as 
has often been supposed’.22 Vernon argues that there is no persuasive blanket explanation of 
unintended consequences such as ‘ignorance’ put forward by Merton.23 Thus, he concludes 
that this notion does not represent a promising explanatory avenue. However, this is not at 
odds with Merton’s interpretation of unintended consequences, as Merton recognizes that 
factors explaining the consequences are no more than factors and no one of these necessarily 
‘serve by itself to explain any concrete case’.24 
Merton’s classification of unintended consequences thus provides a useful research 
framework for a variety of social contexts, as any individual or collective behaviour may 
have different impacts on the social setting. The examination of laws and their unintended 
consequences is even more significant for several reasons.
25
 Law regulates almost every 
aspect of social life and imposes rules to be complied with. As Erich Good points out, the 
protection of society is often invoked as a reason for the adoption of specific regulation, 
though this may not have the effects sought.
26
 Likewise, the impacts of laws and regulations 
should also be examined by scrutinizing the extent of unintended consequences resulting 
from the application of a specific law. As law applies to everyone within a certain 
jurisdiction, it becomes imperative to scrutinize its consequences. 
The impact of regulation becomes even more important in a more responsive 
regulatory milieu with greater reliance on formal analysis of risk and benefits. This is 
certainly the case in regulating environmental risks, where governments and regulators are 
under pressure to assess the impact of their laws and policies. To that effect, both national 
governments and the EU have put in place various mechanisms which should assist in 
predicting the outcomes of laws and policies.
27
 This interface between environmental law and 
its consequences can be examined by Merton’s theoretical framework, as the three factors 
that lead to unintended consequences are fully applicable to environmental decision making. 
The state of scientific and empirical knowledge, error in assessing the risk of evidence and 
the actor’s paramount concerns are the most frequent reasons for failing to anticipate the 
unintended consequences of laws and regulations. 
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Merton’s methodological approach can be specifically applied to the EU’s air 
pollution policy process. First, the factors that Merton identifies as leading to unintended 
consequences provide an explanatory model of the EU’s failure to anticipate the outcomes of 
its formal policy on air pollution. It is the ‘imperious immediacy of interest’, Merton’s third 
factor, that limits the correct anticipation of consequences of action in this instance. This 
occurs when an individual or an entity focuses primarily on accomplishing an immediate 
interest, so as to purposefully ignore the possibility of unintended consequences of the same 
action.
28
 This also begs the question of the rationality of the decision made. Merton argues 
that an action motivated by an interest does not necessarily entail a ‘rational calculation of the 
elements in the situation’.29 It is rational in the sense that it intends to achieve a particular 
goal.
30
 However, it may be irrational in the sense that it could detract from achieving other 
values, which, while not being key objectives, still form part of the individual’s or entity’s 
scale of values.
31
 
Second, the application of Merton’s approach to EU’s regulatory shift to CO2 
emissions and its departure from an earlier air quality approach exposes deficiencies of the 
EU’s policy-making process in this area. It questions the EU’s ability to anticipate the 
consequences of its formal action in an environment where the EU has to reconcile different 
objectives and a variety of stakeholders’ interests and ensure that they all form part of the 
decision-making process. As Richardson argues, the EU is a unique policy-making system 
where the openness of the decision-making process to lobbyists and the significant weight of 
national politico-administrative elites within the process create an unpredictable and multi-
level policy-making environment.
32
 This is particularly pertinent to environmental regulation 
where the EU regulator, in preparing policy and proposals relating to the environment, public 
health and consumer safety, is highly dependent on the input of various actors and interests 
groups which have become part of the decision-making process. Likewise, the intersection of 
environmental law with many other policy areas brings more stakeholders to the negotiating 
table. Thus, the EU regulator has to address interests of numerous actors, institutions and 
processes with different preferences and different policy traditions which may at times lead to 
policy shift as a result of compromise between actors. In the case of EU air pollution, the 
political choices made did not match the best interests of the ‘consumers’ of regulation, 
namely European citizens. As Sunstein argues ‘some environmental outcomes may well be a 
reflection of the asymmetry between political and consumption choices, an asymmetry 
sometimes attributable to the peculiar features of political deliberation’.33 
In the case of air pollution, the EU attempts to achieve different policy interests and to 
that effect deploys various regulatory approaches.
34
 However, there may be a disconnect 
between those interests whereby, as Merton argues, the pursuit of a paramount interest may 
defeat the pursuit of objectives which are not immediate interests but are still located on the 
EU’s scale of values. In the early 1970s, the EU established minimum air quality standards 
and maximum emission standards for a group of harmful pollutants and regulated these 
emissions from mobile and stationary sources.
35 
As road transport represented a major 
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contributor to air pollution in urban areas, the EU also introduced environmental vehicle 
products standards regulating emissions of a number of harmful substances. However, 
climate change concerns as opposed to pollution concerns in EU transportation policy led, 
over time, to changing the regulatory approach to emissions from vehicles by focusing solely 
on the paramount and immediate interest of reducing CO2 emissions. This resulted in a 
disconnect between regulation of urban air quality and vehicle emissions standards with the 
effect of producing unintended consequences of unlawful levels of air pollution, in particular 
nitrogen oxides and particulate matter emissions. 
Returning to Merton’s argument, this decision was rational in terms of the immediacy 
of interests the EU wanted to achieve and its ability to attain them. First, this overriding 
interest of reducing CO2 fitted well with the EU’s objective of strengthening its climate 
change agenda and its ‘actorness’ in this area, as well as boosting the EU economy at a time 
of economic crisis. Regulating vehicle emissions was an obvious choice, as CO2 emissions 
were constantly increasing and there were no legally binding measures to regulate them. The 
EU decided to put in place incentives for the car industry to invest in diesel technology and 
thus improve the overall performance of diesel car engines.
36
 Second, pursuing this interest 
proved to be appealing for major stakeholders in the policy-making process, which is not an 
easy task in the fragmented EU policy-making structure. After years of negotiation, the EU 
institutions reached an agreement with the strong car industry lobby to introduce legally 
binding measures on CO2 emissions after years of voluntary agreements.
37
 This agreement 
was also acceptable for national governments, as it led to a boost of national car industries 
with a positive effect on national economies. Finally, consumers benefited from financial 
incentives to shift car purchases to low-carbon technology, in particular diesel engines. 
However, this regulatory approach failed to take into account the interests of local and 
regional authorities in Member States which play a crucial role in implementing the urban air 
quality laws and policies. They are poorly represented through the Committee of the Regions 
and they are not nearly as influential as the car industry. The EU’s failure to achieve urban air 
quality standards ultimately shifted the burden to local authorities to address the growing 
problem of urban air pollution. Thus, this poses questions about deficiencies in formulating 
the EU laws and policies in the area of environmental law. 
 
3 A DISCONNECT OF REGULATORY APPROACHES: A REGULATORY SHIFT 
TO REDUCING CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS AS THE EU’S OVERRIDING 
INTEREST 
 
In considering the disconnect of regulatory approaches that led to these unintended 
consequences, it is necessary to evidence the emergence of the regulatory shift in relation to 
vehicle emissions standards by demonstrating the correlation between the EU’s action and its 
effects, as well as the actual purpose of this regulatory shift. This is in line with Merton’s 
argument that proving causality and determining the actual purposes of a given action are two 
methodological pitfalls in establishing unintended consequences.
38
 The first pitfall involves 
the causal imputation, which requires proving the extent to which ‘consequences’ may 
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justifiably be attributed to certain actions.
39
 The other difficulty is ascertaining the actual 
purpose of a given action.
40
 As Merton argues, the latter pitfall may be averted in cases of 
organised action that requires explicit statement of goal and procedure.
41
 Thus, in this section 
I first demonstrate EU measures for improving urban air quality, including the establishment 
of air quality standards and vehicle emissions standards. This is followed by an examination 
of the overall change in policy and legal discourse away from urban air quality to the EU’s 
primary and overriding interests to reduce CO2 as a part of the climate change agenda. 
 
3.1 Urban air quality and vehicle emissions 
 
Since the 1970s, EU environmental law and policy has a long lineage of measures to improve 
air quality, in particular in urban areas. Its 1973 Environmental Action Programme 
commitment to ‘prevent, reduce and as far as possible eliminate air pollution and nuisances’ 
was enacted by taking diverse measures.
42
 As a majority of the European population lives in 
cities and is exposed to elevated levels of air pollutants,
 
it was not surprising that urban 
pollution was one of the first areas to be addressed.
43
 Traditional air pollutants include 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), particulate 
matter (PM), ozone (O3) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).
44
 Thus, the main interest 
of the EU in the 1970s was to ensure good air quality by regulating the emissions of these 
major environmental pollutants, starting with three directives; Directive 80/779 for sulphur 
dioxide and suspended particulates,
45
 Directive 82/884 for lead
46
 and Directive 85/203 for 
nitrogen dioxide
47
. The primary purpose of these directives was to set out air quality limit 
values, including guide limit values for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide.
48
 The 
importance of improving air quality in the urban environment was prominent in this early 
legislation. The Directive on nitrogen oxide recognizes the ‘concept that limit values should 
apply only in locations where people are likely to be exposed over time periods for which 
adverse effects might occur’ leading to a focus on urban areas.49 Member States are also 
given discretion to fix values lower than the limit value than those established by the EC 
Directives if they consider it necessary, especially in urban areas.
50
 
This initial list of substances was subsequently expanded to thirteen harmful air 
pollutants.
51
 Though the setting of limit values for some of the enumerated substances was 
delayed due to opposition from industry, this regulatory approach marked an important 
milestone in EU air pollution policy as the EU succeeded in regulating major air pollutants. 
Currently, the basic instrument on air quality is the Ambient Air Quality Directive 2008/50, 
which merged the existing directives into a single instrument with the main objective of 
regulating the limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, lead, 
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benzene and carbon dioxide.
52
 Local transport authorities play an important role in the 
implementation of this directive, especially in regard to urban pollution from vehicles as they 
can adopt measures to limit transport emissions through traffic planning and management.
53
 
Vehicle emissions standards always formed a part of the EU’s regulatory approach to 
air pollution. Road traffic is the predominant source of atmospheric emissions and the highest 
concentrations of major air pollutants coincide with the location of major cities.
54
 This means 
that vehicle emission standards are inseparable from the EU urban air quality objectives. The 
EU pursued the same regulatory approach by establishing the limit values for major air 
pollutants. The first measure regulating emissions from vehicles, dating from 1970, 
established limit values for emissions from petrol and diesel engine passenger cars and light 
commercial vehicles, including emissions of carbon monoxide; unburnt hydrocarbons; of 
nitrogen oxides and, specifically for diesel engines, of particulate pollutants.
55
 Several 
subsequent directives were adopted with the aim of regulating diesel car engines.
56
 In the 
1990s, a number of measures were adopted with the aim of improving the quality of petrol 
and diesel fuels.
57
 The two main actions were the ban on petrol with lead and the limitation of 
sulphur in diesel fuels in order to improve air quality and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
The adoption of the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution in 2005 under the Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme further intensified the EU’s efforts in improving air 
quality. The Strategy set out ambitious objectives for 2020 to combat further destruction of 
the ecosystem and to reduce premature deaths as a result of environmental impact, which 
required a further decrease of SO2, NOx, VOCs and PM2.5 emissions. It identified a more 
comprehensive monitoring of ambient levels of PM2.5 emissions in urban areas as a first step 
in improving urban air quality.
58
 This prompted the adoption of the Regulation 715/2007 with 
the aim of harmonizing the technical requirements across the EU by introducing the Euro 5 
and 6 standards.
59
 These set out different limit values for four air pollutants: carbon 
monoxide, unburnt hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides and particulate pollutants from light 
passenger cars and commercial vehicles.
60
 Moreover, the directive requires the testing of 
vehicles before they are put on the market by national technical services in Member States. 
 
3.2 The EU’s ‘imperious interest’ to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
 
With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, a greater push could be observed at 
the international level to integrate climate change policy more deeply into other policy areas. 
At the EU level, this led to a major shift in regulatory approach from 2006 by narrowing 
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down the air pollution agenda and focusing primarily on the reduction of CO2 emissions as a 
major greenhouse gas. This move was seen as necessary to satisfy several immediate 
objectives of the EU. The first was to deliver the ambitious EU climate change agenda as a 
response to international binding targets to which the EU committed to under the Kyoto 
Protocol.
61
 The other reason was to enhance the EU’s long-term efforts to position itself as a 
leading global actor in fighting climate change, which required a comprehensive effort to 
develop policies and measures at the EU level involving all sectors. Already at the European 
Council in 2007 we could see an explicit statement of this goal.
62
 The overall EU target was 
set to a 30 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.
63
 
Finally, the EU grasped the opportunity to engage the car industry, which finally accepted the 
imposition of legally binding CO2 targets for vehicles. This would ultimately lead to boosting 
the EU economy at the time of a growing economic crisis. 
The obvious decision in terms of delivering the policy objectives was to focus on 
transport policy, and in particular, road transport. This was confirmed at the 2007 European 
Council where a central role was given to a sustainable and more environmentally efficient 
EU transport policy, together with the implementation of the emission trading scheme.
64
 
Road transport was identified as a sector with continuously rising CO2 emissions, notably in 
urban areas, thereby both jeopardizing progress in improving the urban air quality but also 
risking progress in all other sectors.
65
 Likewise, a ‘green and low-carbon’ car industry 
represented an ideal sector and a perfect proxy to boost the economy and jobs at a time of 
economic crisis, while contributing towards sustainable growth through apparently clean and 
green technologies.
66
 An important reason was also to make the EU car industry more 
competitive on the American and Asian markets where car manufacturers invested heavily in 
developing low-carbon vehicles. 
In order to satisfy these key goals, the EU had to move away from its earlier approach 
and focus exclusively on policies and laws that would lead to the reduction of CO2 emissions. 
This new regulatory approach was not perceived as incompatible with the attainment of urban 
air quality objectives. This is best evidenced by the impact assessments accompanying 
several major legislative measures. In proposing the two EU acts, which set up a legislative 
framework for reducing CO2 emissions from vehicles, namely Regulations 443/2009 and 
510/2011, there was no discussion about the correlation between the new performance 
standards for passenger cars as a part of the EU strategy to reduce CO2 emission and their 
effect on urban air quality.
67
 The document only briefly mentions the possibility of measuring 
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the emissions of other pollutants as a response to citizens’ concerns. A more recent policy 
document, the Clean Air Policy Package, reinforced the climate change agenda by upholding 
measures which are not in line with the urban air quality objectives. Though at the time the 
correlation between diesel cars and air pollution was well known,
68
 this policy document does 
not recognize the need to tighten the EU vehicle emissions standards beyond Euro 6 to 
achieve new air policy targets for 2025 and 2030.
69
 Thus, in time, the measures taken to 
achieve the climate change objectives, by focusing exclusively on CO2 emission from cars, 
inadvertently led to a regulatory disconnect resulting in the unintended consequences of 
unlawful levels of air pollution. 
To enable this regulatory shift, the EU needed to secure the agreement of Member 
States. This was achieved at the 2006 Council of the EU which reiterated that ‘in line with the 
EU strategy on CO2 emissions from light duty vehicles, the average new car fleet should 
achieve CO2 emissions of 140g CO2 /km (2008/09) and 120g CO2 /km (2012)’.
70
 Both the 
Commission and the European Parliament embraced this change.
71
 The EU’s new regulatory 
approach had to be built on the overriding consensus to reduce CO2 emissions. The European 
Commission was instrumental in instituting this new policy by promoting legislative 
discourse on CO2 emissions from vehicles and building a coalition of support, including 
national governments, the car industry and consumers. In its 2007 Review of the Community 
Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles, the 
Commission had to depart from its earlier approach that was primarily reliant on voluntary 
agreements with the car industry. The Commission called for an integrated approach, 
bringing together the EU institutions, Member States, car manufacturers and consumers to 
tackle climate change impacts of road transport.
72
 However, greater participation of local and 
regional authorities responsible for air quality was not perceived as important. The 
Commission recognized the importance of research and development in CO2 reduction 
technologies as the best means to set and achieve more ambitious targets and pledged to 
support this research through the establishment of the European Road Transport Research 
Advisory Council.
73
 This was promptly followed by a set of legislative measures designed to 
address various aspects of CO2 car emission policies. 
One of the first measures addressing CO2 emissions was Regulation 443/2009, which 
prescribed emission performance standards for new passenger cars by setting the average 
CO2 emission at 130g CO2/km as a target to be met by 2015, with the intention of making 
further reduction to 95g CO2/km
 
from 2020.
74
 Interestingly, the impact assessment 
accompanying this proposal does not discuss the impact of this measure on urban air quality 
nor does it address the emissions or measurement of other pollutants from vehicles, though it 
was one of the citizens’ concerns.75 The regulation prescribes both coercive measures and 
incentives for the car industry. In the case of non-compliance, car manufacturers have to pay 
a fine in accordance with the sliding scale provided in the regulation.
76
 The regulation offers 
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several incentives to European manufacturers with the aim of enhancing their competiveness. 
It leaves great flexibility to manufacturers as to how to meet their targets and offers some 
concessions for small-volume and niche manufacturers by setting lower targets. It also 
incentivizes the development of new technologies and the production of low-emitting cars. 
Similarly, Regulation 510/2011 sets emission performance standards for light commercial 
vehicles within the EU’s integrated approach to reduce CO2 emission from road transport and 
provides for the same types of incentives for the car industry, including pooling options, 
super credits and incentives to use eco-innovation technologies.
77
 
The lack of attention to other environmental objectives was further evidenced by the 
EU’s approach to encourage involvement of national governments. Attainment of the 
‘imperious interest’, as Merton puts it, of reducing CO2 emissions was also contingent on 
Member States acting in a similar direction. Thus, in its review of the EU strategy to reduce 
CO2 emissions from vehicles, the Commission encouraged Member States to introduce car 
taxation policies and other fiscal incentives to support this shift to low-carbon road 
transport.
78
 In terms of the former, the introduction of different car taxes, including 
registration, circulation and fuel taxes as well as other financial instruments was used to 
support the introduction of fuel efficient and low CO2 emitting cars.
79
 This would 
additionally incentivize car manufacturers to invest in the development of clean light-duty 
vehicles at the EU market, which in turn would contribute to meeting climate change targets 
and would avoid the fragmentation of the EU internal market.
80
 Most Member States reacted 
positively and introduced lower taxes for diesel engines.
81
 For example, Belgium introduced 
significantly lower taxes for diesel cars, which led to a proportionately high ownership of 
diesel cars; 61 percent one of cars in Belgium in 2010 were diesel.
82
 In terms of consumers, 
preferential car taxes influenced their purchase decisions. Consumers in the EU were 
responsive to this shift towards diesel as confirmed by the official data of the European 
Environment Agency showing that, in the EU-28, the number of registered diesel vehicles 
increased significantly since 2011.
83
 This is further corroborated by available data from 2013 
whereby 53 percent of all newly registered cars in the EU were diesel cars.
84
 Additionally, 
the EU launched measures to improve consumer information about running costs, 
environmental performance and vehicle tax levels that inform consumer decision making.
85
 
The focus on the immediate reduction of CO2 emissions also offered attractive future 
opportunities for the car industry. In its 2010 European Green Vehicles Strategy, the 
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Commission called for intensive coordination among different sectors (industrial, transport, 
energy, trade, climate action and environment, employment, health and consumers, research) 
as well as increased cooperation with the car manufacturing industry and other 
stakeholders.
86
 It focuses on three main areas, including energy efficiency, reduction of CO2 
emissions and reliable logistics and mobility by primarily encouraging research and setting 
common standards to boost productivity growth and industrial competitiveness.
87
 To that 
effect, several funding sources were set out for the car industry; the initial funding included 
loans from the European Investment Bank and the EU’s Seventh Research Framework 
Programme.
88
 This provided a significant stimulus for the car industry, which was aware of 
increasing environmental pressure but also a more competitive market and rising consumer 
awareness.
89
 In its statement in 2011, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association 
openly emphasized that research and development will ‘shift towards further reduction of 
CO2 emissions, higher energy efficiency and lower noise pollution’.
90
 With €41.5 billion 
invested annually, the automobile sector is the EU’s largest investor in research and 
development.
91
 
The main focus of research and technological improvements for car manufacturers 
has been investment in diesel technology over the years.
92
 This was regarded as a preferable 
option in addressing the regulatory pressures within the climate change agenda for several 
reasons. Due to a different mode of operation, the diesel engine has a greater thermodynamic 
efficiency and hence a higher fuel economy than the petrol engine.
93
 Moreover, this was a 
technology that was already widely developed as it was accepted by car manufacturers as a 
promising route to reach targets agreed in the voluntary agreements with the Commission in 
1998.
94
 As Cames and Helmers point out, Europe’s car fleets have been persistently 
transformed from being petrol-driven to diesel-driven over the last 20 years.
95
 This was 
concurrent with the improvement of diesel car engines over the last decade, including the 
introduction of diesel engines with direct injection, increasing fuel pressure and turbo 
charging.
96
 This technology was marketed by manufacturers as improving vehicle 
performance while increasing fuel economy, all of which helps to lower CO2 emissions.
97
 A 
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good illustration was Volkswagen’s selling strategy where selling ‘clean’ diesels was central 
to its ambition to increase market share in the United States.
98
 
 
4 ANTICIPATED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF EU ACTION ON CAR 
EMISSIONS 
 
As Merton explains, the outcomes of a policy action include intended and anticipated 
consequences, as well as the unintended consequences which are not limited to undesirable 
outcomes of formal action.
99
 Nonetheless, the anticipation of the undesirable results is also 
part of that process, though, for reasons stated by Merton, it may happen that they are ignored 
or overlooked.
100
 By focusing exclusively on CO2 reductions, the EU excluded consideration 
of how urban air quality objectives might be reconciled with this new regulatory approach to 
vehicle emission standards, which does not equally address emissions of other pollutants. 
Measures and policies adopted under the umbrella of the regulatory shift reflected the 
overriding consensus in achieving the immediate interest to reduce CO2 emissions as a part of 
the climate change agenda. The Commission focused primarily on securing the participation 
of the car industry, without engaging other significant stakeholders such as local and regional 
authorities. However, the pursuit of the EU’s overriding interest led to unintended 
consequences of undermining urban air quality objectives, including unlawful emissions of 
certain pollutants and spill-over effects on the car industry and consumers. It also placed the 
burden of air pollution, the unintended consequences of EU air pollution law and policy, onto 
urban conurbations, although they did not play any role in the policy-making process. Thus, 
this section will uncover both anticipated and unintended consequences and discuss 
attribution of these consequences to the EU’s action. 
 
4.1 Intended and anticipated outcome of the EU’s policy: carbon dioxide emissions from 
vehicles reduced 
 
There is no doubt that the EU’s paramount concern in reducing CO2 emissions, implemented 
through a combination of the wide range of measures, coupled with numerous incentives for 
the car industry, led to the attainment of this specific and desirable goal. According to the 
official statistics of the European Environment Agency, CO2 emission were below the targets 
set by Regulation 443/2009 for new passenger cars.
101
 In 2015, the average CO2 emissions 
from the new car fleet were, on average, 119.5g/km which is well below 130g CO2/km target 
and a reduction of 3.1 per cent compared to emission in 2014.
102
 The CO2 target of 95 grams 
of CO2/km by the year 2021 prescribed by this regulation, is also expected to be reached.
103
 
Legal and policy measures aimed at reducing these emissions by incentivizing 
research and development of new technologies made significant contributions. Studies 
conducted by the Joint Research Centre confirmed that on-road CO2 emissions of light-duty 
diesel and gasoline vehicles generally remained below respective emission standards.
104
 For 
some countries such as France the development of diesel technology and the introduction of 
small diesel vehicles are regarded as the main reasons for low CO2 emissions.
105
 It is also 
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important to note that almost all car manufacturers were compliant and on track to reach their 
2015 targets.
106
 
 
4.2 The effect of the unintended consequences of EU’s policy 
 
The EU’s ‘imperious immediacy’ in reducing CO2 emissions from vehicles excluded the 
consideration of other environmental interests that are equally important in regulating air 
pollution, most importantly urban air quality. The EU’s regulatory shift led by this overriding 
interest resulted in several unintended consequences, including the unlawful emissions of 
nitrogen oxides and pollutant matters. As a result, a large proportion of EU citizens and 
ecosystems still remain exposed to air pollution in excess of EU and WHO standards.
107
 In 
2016, the European Environment Agency published data showing exceeding levels of 
pollution in urban areas in the EU, most notably NOx.
108
 Just in 2015, the annual limit value 
for nitrogen dioxide was ‘widely exceeded across Europe, with 93 per cent of all exceedances 
occurring close to roads’.109 The limits values were exceeded for particulate matter too. The 
daily limit values were exceeded in 21 out of 28 Member States, which illustrates the scope 
and breadth of the problem.
110
 
One of the main anthropogenic sources of PM and nitrogen oxides is the combustion 
process, most notably in fossil fuel vehicles and power plants. Transport is one of the largest 
contributors to Europe’s air pollution caused by NOx, ‘accounting for 46% of total EU-28 
emissions just in 2013’.111 Further data show that the investments in new low-carbon 
technologies, in particular the diesel boom, contributed significantly to the overall NOx and 
particulate matter emissions in the EU. In its 2015 report, the European Environment Agency 
concluded that the increase in diesel cars, which was encouraged by financial incentives in 
many Member States, is seen as an important cause of fine particulate matter and nitrogen 
oxides pollution.
112
  
The unintended consequences of excessive levels of these pollutants have had serious 
impacts on the health of citizens of the EU, especially in urban areas. Exposure to these 
pollutants is one of the main reasons for premature death and shorter life expectancy, 
especially in the well-known hot-spot regions such as parts of Benelux, northern Italy and the 
southeast of England.
113
 As Kelly points out, the epidemiological and toxicological research 
supports a link between urban air pollution and an increased incidence and/or severity of 
airway disease.
114
 There is a spill-over effect whereby the health implications led to 
increasing medical costs, reduced productivity and economic losses. Exposure to air pollution 
also has had an impact on European ecosystems. Again, one of the most harmful air 
pollutants is nitrogen oxides, which contribute to the acidification of soil, lakes and rivers, 
causing the loss of animal life, plants and biodiversity.
115
 
The unintended consequences also reveal the important role local and regional 
authorities should have in formulating the urban air pollution policy. As a reaction to these 
health concerns, politicians in major European cities such as London and Paris had to step in 
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to remedy the situation caused by the EU air pollution policy, despite the lack of their voice 
in the EU policy-making process. There have been calls in these cities for a ban of diesel 
vehicles and greater reliance on green technologies. Just after the Volkswagen scandal, the 
Liberal Democrats in the London Assembly demanded a ban on diesel vehicles or the 
introduction of more stringent tests to detect pollution.
116
 The Environment Committee of the 
London Assembly published a report in 2015, which considered various alternatives to diesel 
technology as diesel exhaust is a major contributor to air pollution in London and accounts 
for 40 percent of the capital’s NOx emissions.117 The 2010 Report of the Committee on the 
Medical Effects of Air Pollutants calculated that the effect on mortality of particulate air 
pollution ‘was equivalent to nearly 29,000 deaths in 2008 in the UK as a whole’.118 It is 
estimated that just in 2010, across London over 3,000 extra deaths per year were attributed to 
toxic particles in the air.
119
 Besides considering the ban on diesel vehicles, the Committee has 
called for the promotion of low emission technologies for heavy vehicles, such as plug-in 
hybrid, plug-in electric, hydrogen fuel cell electric.
120
 Similarly, the mayor of Paris 
announced a ban on diesel vehicles made before 2011 from Paris streets as an urgent measure 
to improve the health of residents.
121
 More recently, in May 2016, a coalition of 20 mayors 
from major European cities issued a public statement and called for tighter air pollution limits 
on new diesel cars after the failure of the European Parliament to introduce stricter limit 
values for NOx from vehicles.
122
 
The regulatory shift in EU air pollution policy from vehicles may result in several 
other spill-over effects emerging as additional serious and costly unintended consequences 
for the car industry in the aftermath of the Volkswagen scandal. Though it may be still too 
early to identify the full impact of the scandal, this incident will certainly raise the costs of 
compliance for the car industry, which is evident from the immediate legislative activism of 
the EU institutions in the aftermath of the Volkswagen scandal.
123
 Compliance with new 
standards and new targets certainly adds financial and institutional strains on car 
manufacturers, which will consequently be reflected in the costs of producing cars. This will 
have an impact on consumers as the costs will be passed on to them. Though the effect on 
sales may take longer to kick in, there is already a noticeable decrease in the number of diesel 
cars sold.
124
 This demonstrates that the confidence of consumers is somewhat shaken. Most 
consumers make purchase choices based on price, while a smaller number will think about 
environmental concerns of purchasing a diesel car. However, their choice may be impacted 
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by government’s schemes to scrap old diesel cars and incentives to buy low emission cars.125 
This may have a negative effect for the EU car market as the EU is the largest market for 
diesel vehicles. 
In order to respond to the new regulatory and compliance rules, and address 
consumers’ preferences, car manufacturers have to rethink their business strategies in regard 
to diesel, especially after the Volkswagen scandal, which has left these in disarray. Moreover, 
by switching to diesel, the EU missed the opportunity to comprehensively develop electric 
and hybrid technologies. Thus, a changed business strategy will most likely include 
investments into cleaner technologies such as hybrid and electric cars. As these new 
technologies are expensive and sophisticated, in the medium term, they will drive car prices 
up and they still may not be as affordable as diesel or petrol cars. Moreover, it will be very 
difficult for the EU car industry to compete with non-European manufacturers which already 
developed clean technology. For example, Toyota (of Japan) currently leads in hybrid 
engines while Tesla (of the United States) leads in electric cars. This is yet another 
unintended consequence of the EU’s policy on vehicle emission. Ultimately, these 
unintended consequences for manufacturers and consumers pose a wider question on the 
future of climate change policy, which for some time was highly dependent on the use of 
diesel vehicles as affordable option for consumers. This puts in question the future attainment 
of the EU’s international climate change obligations. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Unintended consequences of the EU’s air pollution law and policy resulted from the EU’s 
primary focus on reducing CO2 emissions and undermined the equally important 
environmental objective of urban air quality. To that effect, the EU adopted a number of 
legislative and policy measures, mostly providing incentives for car manufacturers to further 
develop diesel technology as an ideal way to reach EU CO2 targets. This resulted in intended 
consequences of reducing CO2 emissions. However, the unintended consequences are grave 
and include unlawful levels of air pollution in urban areas, in particular nitrogen oxide and 
particulate matter. Though it is still too early to measure, the implications for car 
manufacturers are significant. They are faced with compliance costs that will be passed on to 
consumers, as well as the need to quickly transform their business strategies to become more 
competitive and more innovative in electric and hybrid technologies. 
What does this tell us about policy making in the EU? This example gives more 
insight into the challenges in formulating environmental policies in a multi-level entity. The 
EU is comprised of various policy-making levels, where policy and legal measures are 
defined at the EU and national level, but mostly enforced at the regional or local level. 
Instead of ensuring a stronger voice for those levels, the EU has to ensure the participation of 
key interest groups on which political deliberation depends. Due to the car industry’s refusal 
to accept binding CO2 targets, the EU had to accept voluntary agreements with car 
manufacturers. Over time, the EU succeeded in bringing the car industry on board to achieve 
its climate change agenda. Whether this was a premeditated policy shift or not, the new 
policy objectives were to be achieved by diesel technology that was already in place and very 
lucrative and appealing for the car industry. At the same time, it fitted perfectly with the 
immediate objectives the EU was trying to achieve; reducing CO2 emission by focusing on 
emission trading scheme and road transport. The key shift to CO2 emissions came after 2005, 
when the Kyoto Protocol came into force. 
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The areas that are most adversely affected by NOx and particulate emissions in the 
EU are large urban conurbations. Some of these areas do not have unified political structures. 
For example, the West Midlands conurbation in the UK is one of the worst affected areas for 
air pollution in the UK and it is split between numerous councils and authorities. The diffuse 
organization of many such areas across the EU renders them silent in policy making on 
emissions regulation at the EU level. The actors who can mobilize expertise and resources, 
such as the European car industry, and have institutional representation at the EU and 
national levels were able to pursue ‘an immediacy of interest’ in reducing CO2 emissions. 
This led to an unintended consequence of NOx and particulate emissions worsening air 
quality for millions of Europeans in urban areas. 
Still, these unintended consequences open questions that may represent another 
avenue of research. Despite the early signs of discrepancies between emission levels in 
laboratory conditions and real driving conditions,
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 it seems that EU was primarily 
concerned with attaining the immediate and foreseen objectives, i.e. reduction of CO2 
emissions. In the case of emissions policy in the EU there seems to have been a case of 
‘cognitive dissonance’ where the key institutional actors were unable to accept that, while 
CO2 emissions were down, there have been negative effects through NOx and particulate 
emissions. The success of reducing CO2 emissions further perpetuated the air pollution 
effects. As environmental regulation is dependent on the input of scientific expertise, this 
phenomenon poses a significant risk to the application of impartial scientific advice. 
There are several potential implications of this example of unintended consequences 
for regulation more generally. First, it suggests that parties affected by regulation should have 
sufficient participation in the formulation of regulation or policy. European urban 
conurbations and their citizens had little input into the EU’s climate change agenda, yet they 
have been adversely affected by persistent air pollution. There may be greater scope for local 
and regional actors in the formulation of environmental policy in the EU. Second, in 
assessing risk of action in any domain it is imperative that actors who are affected by a course 
of action are identified and risks are highlighted. In pursuing a policy of reducing CO2 
emissions the EU and Member States failed to identify the effect this would have on air 
pollution in urban areas. The impact assessment methodology used by the Commission could 
be broadened to allow for a more detailed examination of economic, social and 
environmental impacts of a proposal across relevant cross-sectoral policy areas, such as 
industry and transport. Third, the environment is complex and variable, yet the EU’s 
regulatory approach focused on a single issue. The primacy of CO2 reductions subsumed 
other considerations, in particular air quality in European cities. This suggests that 
environmental regulation should be holistic rather than centred on a single issue. Finally, the 
EU failed to take into account the effect that CO2 regulation had on the behaviour of actors. 
The promotion of diesel may have incentivized Volkswagen to develop and deploy ‘cheat’ 
devices as the regulatory aims and discourse were about CO2 reduction. Ideally, 
environmental policy makers should have greater foresight on how actions of certain parties 
will change based on the incentives created by any new policy. The policy implications of 
this research should highlight to policy makers that a particular course of action in the 
environmental field may carry risks of reverberative effects that are potentially more far-
reaching and critical than in other sectors. 
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